Werkkamp 2007

The Road to Nahr al-Barid: Lebanese Political Discourse and Palestinian Civil Rights
September 10th, 2007 – Tadamon
Middle East Report. by Muhammad Ali Khalidi and Diane Riskedahl

How long will the state erect military checkpoints in residential areas, treating them as though they were camps sheltering wanted people and gunmen, while all the Palestinian camps, which shelter criminals and wanted people, enjoy freedom of movement, politically, militarily and in terms of security, as though they were security islands independent of Lebanon politically, militarily and in terms of security?
—Jibran Tuwayni, al-Nahar (July 18th, 2002)
The view expressed by assassinated Lebanese Member of Parliament and editorialist Jibran Tuwayni has become depressingly familiar among Lebanese politicians since the end of the Lebanese civil war. Though Tuwayni was a firebrand of what is now the loyalist camp in Lebanese politics, his perspective is also shared by elements of the current opposition, particularly members of the parliamentary bloc loyal to former Gen. Michel Aoun. There may be more than a grain of truth in the saying that the only thing that unites the Lebanese political factions today is antipathy for the Palestinians living in their midst.
The 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, home to some 400,000 people according to official UN figures, have been perceived in the past decade and a half as zones of lawlessness within sovereign Lebanese territory. They are regularly described by politicians and pundits as “security islands,” the implication being that they are regions of insecurity in a sea of peace. Anyone who has been following events since the civil war formally ended in 1989, of course, will know that Lebanon has not been fully secure during this time. Moreover, the camps are not the only parts of the country that have witnessed the occasional violent flareup. Yet the impression persists that they are safe havens for criminals and outlaws.
It is against this backdrop that the summer 2007 events in the northernmost Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Barid must be seen. When fighting broke out in and around the camp in late May, some commentators blamed it on the fact that the camps were hotbeds of extremism that defied all efforts by Lebanese security forces to bring them under control. Indeed, many reports stated that the Lebanese army and security forces were prevented from entering the camps due to a secret agreement struck between the Lebanese army and the Palestine Liberation Organization in Cairo in 1969. Widely known as the Cairo Agreement, the document authorized Palestinian Armed Struggle, a security arm of the PLO, to “undertake the task of regulating and determining the presence of arms in the camps within the framework of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution,” according to an unofficial text that was later leaked to the press. What these press reports missed, however, was that the agreement was officially rescinded by the Lebanese parliament on May 21, 1987, exactly 20 years before clashes erupted in Nahr al-Barid. There is therefore no legal barrier to the entry of Lebanese troops into the Palestinian refugee camps. In fact, Lebanese army checkpoints are positioned at the entrances of most Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanese police regularly enter the camps to arrest suspects and carry out other functions.
If they are not really the islands of insecurity that they are claimed to be, why are the refugee camps represented as such? One answer is surely that Palestinians have long served as a convenient scapegoat upon which to blame the civil war and Lebanon’s ills since that war came to an end with the Ta’if Agreement in 1989. But this answer leads to another question: If there is a serious interest in eliminating “security islands” on the part of the state, why has the Lebanese army not entered the Palestinian refugee camps? The answer to that question is somewhat more complex. Arguably, in the fragmented quasi-state that is post-war Lebanon, it suits the interests of various groups to maintain pockets of the country that can be blamed for outbreaks of instability. Different factions can use them to foment unrest, while maintaining “plausible deniability” that they are the instigators of the disturbances. The losers in this dangerous political game are primarily the refugees themselves.
Fatah al-Islam
Fighting broke out in Nahr al-Barid on May 20 after a group designating itself Fatah al-Islam launched a dramatic nighttime raid against the Lebanese army, resulting in the deaths of 27 Lebanese soldiers, some of them killed in their beds. At least some of these militants then allegedly withdrew to locations within Nahr al-Barid, prompting the army to unleash an artillery barrage upon the refugee camp, which is also home to some 35,000 (mainly) Palestinian civilians. The camp is a densely packed neighborhood of ramshackle concrete buildings, some three or four stories high. It is bordered to the east by a swath of agricultural land and is located on the outskirts of Lebanon’s second largest city, Tripoli.

Reports differ widely as to the provenance and motivation of the Fatah al-Islam group. Most accounts agree that it is composed of a few hundred fighters of various Arab and Muslim nationalities (including Lebanese, Syrians, Saudi Arabians and others). The Lebanese opposition claims that they were largely the creation of the loyalist Future Movement led by MP Saad al-Hariri, while the government accuses them of being a Syrian implant that infiltrated the country through the porous Syrian border. Though the subsequent fighting has arguably not been in the interest of either the government or the opposition, each side may have had some motivation for encouraging Fatah al-Islam in the first place and for allowing it to set up shop in Nahr al-Barid. For pro-government forces such as the Sunni-dominated Future Movement, there would have been a point to arming a Sunni militia to serve as a counterweight to the Shi‘i Hizballah. The aim might not have been to take on the powerful Hizballah militarily, but instead to strike a bargain to disarm the Sunni militia in return for the disarmament of Hizballah. For the opposition groups and especially their Syrian patrons, fomenting unrest may have been desirable in order to topple the government or put pressure upon it not to pursue its anti-Syrian and pro-Western policies. Whatever its origin, Fatah al-Islam may have outmaneuvered both groups and acted independently in attacking the army and engaging it in a protracted firefight in the camp that, at press time, was well into its third month.
Eyewitnesses inside the camp have said that civilian casualties were heavy in the first few days of fighting. A physician who was attending to the wounded for the first four weeks of the conflict told us that there were 17 civilians injured just in the first three days, and an unknown number of dead who were not brought to clinics. Throughout the clashes, it has been difficult to obtain precise civilian casualty figures and it has been widely feared that many civilians were buried in the ruins of the camp. Human rights activists have warned that if independent observers were not given access to the camp as soon as clashes ended, the bodies of the dead might be bulldozed under the rubble. Since fighting erupted without warning, many camp residents were unable to flee and were caught in the crossfire. The first mass evacuation took place on May 23, when 2,000 civilians were allowed to leave. Subsequent days and weeks witnessed a steady stream of evacuees, until Lebanese papers reported that all civilians had left the camp in one final convoy on July 12, apart from the militants’ families and some “wanted” individuals.
When we asked Milad Salama, a nurse in his twenties, why civilians stayed in Nahr al-Barid after the first outbreak of hostilities, he said: “I would turn that question around: How could we leave?” He said no one provided residents with the wherewithal to evacuate the camp, adding that “evacuation was spontaneous” and took place under shelling. He had left on June 17, after four weeks of fighting. He said that he and an accompanying physician, Tawfiq Salih As‘ad, were the last health professionals to evacuate the camp. Together they told a tale of harrowing conditions inside the besieged camp. Salama personally carried stretchers to houses that had been shelled in order to evacuate the wounded. The alleyway outside their clinic was so narrow that two people could scarcely pass each other, yet artillery shells fell into it on more than one occasion. Garbage accumulated at every corner, vermin were rife, mosquitoes swarmed everywhere, and cases of vomiting and diarrhea were common. They gathered fuel from parked cars to supply their single generator to keep essential electrical equipment running and to charge mobile phones for communication with the outside world, they ate moldy bread and drank non-potable water, and performed their medical duties as best they could. When they could no longer do so, they managed to get themselves out.
All men evacuated from the camp were detained by the Lebanese army for interrogation. Salama described a three-day ordeal during which he was held in detention at a military base at al-Qubba near Tripoli. He said that 420 men and boys, some of them as young as 13, were held in three rooms with a common bathroom. They slept on the floor, taking turns to lie down due to overcrowding. Though he was not physically abused or tortured, he said that some of those with him were, merely for being bearded or wearing a kaffiyya. But all were subject to verbal abuse, particularly “crude expressions about the Palestinian people.” Numerous others corroborate Salama’s account. Young men in Beirut have even been arrested and physically abused merely for carrying Palestinian identity papers.
Model Camp?
Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr declared victory in Nahr al-Barid on June 21, after a month of continuous bombardment. The fighting showed no sign of abating, however, and wags have subsequently compared the bold proclamation to President George W. Bush’s ill-fated “Mission Accomplished” statement. Murr’s intent seems to have been to declare victory, then designate all subsequent fighting as “mopping-up operations.” But live images from the camp showed no sign that the fighting had changed pace: Hulking artillery pieces continued to pound the camp from the overlooking hills as helicopter gunships strafed it from the air. The victory declaration seemed to have been designed to appeal to a largely supportive Lebanese public, which was hungry for a positive result after a month of fighting, as well as to the troops themselves, whose morale could not have been high given the relatively large number of casualties (more than 100 soldiers dead in the first two months) sustained against an outnumbered and besieged adversary.
Even though the Lebanese government may not have been raring for a fight with Fatah al-Islam, very soon after the conflict began, it began to make plans to rebuild the camp and transform it into a “model” for the other Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. In the neo-liberal discourse of the state, the most charitable interpretation of this notion would involve converting the camp into a Potemkin village, housing cheap Palestinian labor to replace the Syrian manual labor upon which the Lebanese agricultural, industrial, service and construction sectors are still heavily dependent. If the other camps were to follow suit, they would no longer be an eyesore for the foreign investors and tourists that the Lebanese government is so eager to attract, and the country’s dependence on Syrian labor would be reduced. In the more sinister reading, the government’s plans would require transforming Nahr al-Barid and other camps into ghettos that are constantly under the watchful eye, or more likely the iron fist, of the intelligence services—a situation reminiscent in some respects of the 1950s and 1960s, when Lebanese military intelligence’s notorious Deuxième Bureau reigned supreme in the camps.
Within a couple of weeks of the beginning of the violence, local television stations showed Prime Minister Fuad Siniora poring over maps of the camp with engineers and architects from the engineering consulting firm Khatib and Alami. A move to rebuild Nahr al-Barid according to the dictates of the Lebanese government had begun almost as soon as the conflict began, as though the government knew that the army would embark on a systematic destruction of the camp. But reconstruction plans do not seem to have had the welfare of the refugees in mind and there has been no real attempt to involve the residents of Nahr al-Barid themselves in rebuilding the camp, an attitude that makes them understandably nervous. At one meeting of local NGOs with representatives from the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in late June, tension over this issue was palpable. Meeting near the entrance of Baddawi camp, where many of those from Nahr al-Barid have sought refuge, local aid workers expressed their concerns to the UNRWA officials who are in close contact with the government. They spoke of rumors that bulldozers were poised to enter the camps, as soon as the guns fell silent, to raze what had not been destroyed by military ordnance. A few weeks later, the Lebanese press reported that bulldozers equipped with searchlights were indeed being readied behind the front lines to destroy the remaining structures and remove the rubble.
When UNRWA officials told those assembled that a return to the camp could only take place some three weeks after the fighting had stopped, one former resident of Nahr al-Barid pointed out that the people who were displaced during Israel’s summer 2006 bombardment of Lebanon had returned to their homes in the south within hours of the ceasefire, and that there was no reason that Palestinian refugees could not do the same. But another camp resident, who works for a local NGO that runs child care centers in most of the Palestinian refugee camps, shook her head despairingly and muttered under her breath: “They returned because [Hizballah Secretary-General Hasan] Nasrallah told them to. We don’t have a marja‘iyya.” In this context, the Arabic term marja‘iyya refers to a political leadership that can represent people’s views and respond to their grievances.
Rights and Return
One common complaint among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is lack of political representation. The gap was thought to have been filled by the appointment in May 2006 of Abbas Zaki of Fatah as the PLO representative in Lebanon, a position that had been dormant for several years. The crisis in Nahr al-Barid, however, has shown Zaki to be very loath to criticize Lebanese policies or the conduct of the Lebanese army. His attitude has made it all the more evident that the Palestinian refugees need grassroots representation that would give voice to their concerns rather than a diplomatic mission from the Palestinian Authority to the Lebanese government.
Rather more pressing than the absence of political leadership is the lack of basic civil and social rights for Palestinian refugees. Nearly 60 years after the establishment of the state of Israel displaced and dispossessed them, Palestinians in Lebanon are still without such basic rights as the right to employment, property ownership, health care and social security. In a brief moment of cooperation among the principal Lebanese political actors after the Syrian military withdrawal in April 2005 and before Israel’s war in July-August 2006, the government took a few timid steps to change their circumstances. Palestinians were allowed to work in some jobs provided they were granted a work permit—whose cost is, however, prohibitive for most of them. Most professional jobs remain closed to Palestinians and there is no sign that that will change. Doctors like Tawfiq As‘ad can only practice medicine within the refugee camps; although some work clandestinely at Lebanese clinics, they are always at risk of being fined or arrested by the authorities.
The justification traditionally given by Lebanese officialdom for the deplorable conditions of Palestinian refugees is that withholding civil rights ensures that their presence in Lebanon is temporary. The bugbear of resettlement or naturalization (tawtin) is regularly invoked in Lebanon to justify all manner of abuse against Palestinians, and prohibitions on tawtin are written into the Lebanese constitution as well as the Ta’if Agreement. But while the vast majority of refugees themselves insist on their right to return to Palestine, most also say that this should not preclude their ability to enjoy basic human rights in Lebanon. Indeed, many argue that it is only if their civil rights are granted that they can be empowered as a community to demand redress in the context of a regional settlement.
Lasting Impact
Ironically, it is not the return to Palestine, but rather the return to their refugee camp that is now the immediate concern of the inhabitants of Nahr al-Barid. Though this has been their consistent demand, it is unlikely that they will be allowed to do so when the conflict is over. The Lebanese authorities and UNRWA have cited the fact that the camp has been mined and booby-trapped by the Fatah al-Islam militants to justify preventing the refugees from returning to their homes as soon as the fighting stops. It has also become increasingly evident that there will be few if any habitable buildings left to return to due to massive artillery bombardment by the Lebanese military. The director of UNRWA recently confirmed that the refugees would not be allowed back quickly, saying that temporary accommodations would have to be found for them elsewhere while the camp was being rebuilt.
Despite the fact that most Lebanese politicians have been careful to point out that Fatah al-Islam is not a Palestinian group and that the majority of its members hold other nationalities, the legacy of the battle for Nahr al-Barid is likely to be tough times for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The security clampdown on Palestinians has already been launched, leading to many cases of physical abuse. According to Human Rights Watch, both the army and the Internal Security Forces have engaged in wanton harassment of innocent Palestinian civilians. During a peaceful demonstration just outside Baddawi refugee camp on June 29, two protesters were shot dead and dozens more wounded by the army. Human Rights Watch accused the Lebanese Army of an “unlawful use of force” and called on the government to launch an impartial investigation into the shooting.
The US seems as devoted to this conflict as the Lebanese government, quickly coming to the aid of the Lebanese army with supplies. The transfer of military aid was effected in record time and has continued throughout the fighting. US military hardware was first delivered on May 25, when several transport planes flew into the Beirut airport, carrying ammunition and equipment for the Lebanese army; the following day more planes arrived from US military bases as well as from US client states in the region. US military aid to Lebanon has increased dramatically, from $40 million in 2006 to a requested $280 million in 2007. Most of this military aid is not of the type that would help the army defend the country’s borders, such as anti-aircraft weapons to deter the constant Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory. Rather, it is the kind of hardware that will enhance the army’s ability to deal with internal “disturbances,” whose main victims are usually civilians.
The conflict in and around the refugee camp could inaugurate a new era for Lebanon, one of a security-obsessed regime in which all citizens are potential suspects in an extended “war on terror.” Physical and verbal abuse by the security forces has broadened beyond the Palestinians to include any suspicious-looking individual, preferably young, male, bearded and swarthy, in a Lebanese version of racial profiling. There are also clear signs of jingoism among the general populace. Despite the fact that the country is sharply divided by a political and sectarian schism, most factions are united in backing the army and demanding a tough clampdown on Palestinians and other suspect elements. If Lebanon does not fall apart due to internal strife, it may yet turn into another Middle Eastern police state.

UNRWA "not satisfied" with pace of reconstruction in Palestinian refugee camp
Interview, Electronic Lebanon, 23 June 2008

BEIRUT (IRIN) - One year on since the fighting between Islamist militant group Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army destroyed most of the northern Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp and displaced up to 40,000 of its residents, the pace of reconstruction remains grindingly slow.

The "old camp," inside the official boundary, is mostly rubble and is the responsibility of the UN agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA) to rebuild. In the larger adjacent areas, commonly known as the "new camp," UNRWA has a limited remit to operate.

Some 2,000 families of the 5,553 displaced have now returned to accessible areas, mainly in the new camp, and most to rented accommodation or temporary shelters.

On 23 June in Vienna, UNRWA will be asking international donors for US$445m for the reconstruction and recovery of both old and new Nahr al-Bared camps, as well as neighboring Baddawi camp and the surrounding areas.

Ahead of the conference, IRIN spoke to Richard Cook, director of UNRWA affairs in Lebanon.

IRIN: You're asking donors for $445 million. How is that money going to be spent?

RC: The money will be held in a multi-donor trust fund with three windows in it; one for UNRWA, one for the Lebanese government and one for the World Bank.

Of the $445 million, around $282 million will be for UNRWA for reconstruction and recovery in the old camp. Around $80 million will be a cash fund for families in the new camp to help them pay for reconstruction. For this, UNRWA will act as a facilitator of the payments. A Palestinian committee will oversee the claims process, as well as a government auditor, but it is up to UNRWA to make the payments. They will be made in stages.

For example, if we have $30,000 to give a family, we will pay $10,000 and then monitor how it was spent before paying the next installment. The remainder of the $445 million will go on rehabilitating Baddawi camp and [addressing] the socio-economic impact of the conflict, both of which we are in charge of.

UNRWA is also launching our own separate funding appeal for relief and early recovery operations to provide funds for those still displaced, temporary accommodation, food and non-food items, medical and education needs. That totals $39.7 million and covers 1 Sept 2008 to 31 Sept 2009. But we're launching that after the Vienna conference.

IRIN: It's a year on since the fighting that destroyed Nahr al-Bared yet speaking to agencies operating in the new camp, no one seems to have a clear idea who is taking the lead in reconstruction efforts. Can you tell us what the situation is?

RC: The new camp is the responsibility of the Lebanese government. They are responsible for infrastructure and housing, but they have asked UNRWA to assist.

IRIN: But, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) repaired the main water pipes in the new camp in March yet there was a delay of many weeks before those pipes were actually connected to homes. Was this because UNRWA is not able to undertake infrastructure work outside the official camp boundary? If so, how did you get around this?

RC: UNRWA has now connected the water pipes to individual houses in the new camp, working alongside partners Islamic Relief. We were able to do this because it is classified as an emergency response. The government is responsible for further rehabilitation, such as roads. But UNRWA is looking for an exit strategy as we can't continue the emergency response indefinitely.
IRIN: Other agencies say they made proposals to assist UNRWA in the new camp, but have received little response in return. For example, UNRWA's temporary shelters have come in for criticism. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) say they made proposals for erecting temporary shelters, which is one of their specialties, but that UNRWA went ahead on its own.

RC: No NGOs [non-governmental organizations] came forward to say they have the capacity to do this. As far as I know, NRC has only worked with us in the camp on building a bridge over the river. We do our best to make temporary accommodation as livable as possible, but it's not going to be like living at home.

People were desperate to get out of the conditions they were living in and so some of the units were built too quickly. The major problem we had was obtaining land as the neighboring communities saw them as potentially permanent camps on their doorstep.

We're now using the more traditional method of cinder blocks, but these take longer to build. We are willing to work with anybody who can do the job better than UNRWA can. The question is: could what UNRWA has done be improved upon in the circumstances? Coordination can improve, but we've done a lot to bring in other agencies, such as the ILO [International Labour Organization], UNICEF [UN children's agency], UNDP [UN Development Program], and UNHCR [UN refugees agency], who have all played an active role.

IRIN: Given the legal complexities involved and the fact that so many different agencies have a budget to work with Palestinians, why was OCHA [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] not involved in coordinating the reconstruction effort?

RC: OCHA in the past has played a very important role. We were asked in the immediate relief effort if we needed support and we said we didn't. UNRWA is on the ground dealing with the population for whom we are responsible. UNRWA had the capacity to deal with it and we did deal with it. If we had felt there was an overriding benefit to do so, we would have asked OCHA for assistance.

IRIN: It's clear UNRWA is caught in a murky legal framework when it undertakes projects outside official camp boundaries. The government has asked you to assist in the new camp, yet your remit doesn't allow you to build what could be construed as permanent structures, such as cinder block shelters. Why not just ask the government for a new deal to expand the official boundary of Nahr al-Bared to include all areas of the camp in use by Palestinians?

RC: We raised the issue of expanded camp land several months ago and were told very emphatically by the prime minister that this was out of the question.

IRIN: Are you satisfied with the pace of reconstruction?

RC: I'm not satisfied with the pace of reconstruction so far. Clearing the rubble is taking much longer. The evaluation has only been completed in the past few weeks, after we were given access to the old camp. The rubble needs substantial demining and there's lots of it. The army has made only a superficial sweep.

In our own compound there was an explosion as we began removing rubble this month. The UNDP is overseeing the rubble removal but it will take between eight to 12 months just to clear the unexploded ordnance.

IRIN: Other UN agencies and international NGOs highlight what they see as a gap in UNRWA's mandate in terms of protection. They say that Palestinians are not having their rights protected because UNRWA doesn't serve that function.

RC: Protection is broken down into military, legal, general and advocacy. In terms of general protection, UNRWA absolutely serves that function. UNRWA's Gaza Refugee Affairs officer has a substantive protection mandate. It's just not called that. We have been working with OHCHR [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights] on issues in Nahr al-Bared and this is the first time the two agencies have worked on a common issue like this.

For example, we know of 24 young people from Nahr al-Bared who are still in prison and we are following up with ICRC over this. We also ask the army to grant us and residents better access to the camp.

IRIN: Both the government and the Palestinian leadership say Nahr al-Bared will not return to the autonomous Palestinian security system that is in place in the other 11 camps across Lebanon, and stems from the Cairo Agreement of 1969. That's a sea change in terms of Palestinian-Lebanese relations isn't it?

RC: Yes, Nahr al-Bared will come under a community policing approach, using both Lebanese and Palestinian security forces. This has been voiced by both sides. The crisis of Nahr al-Bared has further solidified the relationship between the government and Palestinian leadership. Palestinians have made it clear they do not want those kinds of people [Fatah al-Islam] but they are concerned with their inability to deal with them.

We have seen a coming together of factions that wouldn't otherwise have come together. This was an exceptional situation and I hope we never see it again. But there is now a door open, a new approach that would not have been considered realistic two or three years ago.

This item comes to you via IRIN, a UN humanitarian news and information service, but may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. All IRIN material may be reposted or reprinted free-of-charge; refer to the copyright page for conditions of use. IRIN is a project of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

UNRWA's Nahr al-Bared appeal leaves out Palestinian participation
Report, Electronic Lebanon, 25 June 2008

BEIRUT (IRIN) - As the UN's agency for Palestine refugees UNRWA appeals for US$445 million for three years of reconstruction and recovery in and around Lebanon's Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, a mixed picture of aid agency coordination has emerged from interviews with key players.

Speaking to IRIN ahead of the 23 June donor conference in Vienna, the director of UNRWA affairs in Lebanon, Richard Cook, expressed satisfaction with his agency's emergency response operation, though admitted the pace of reconstruction was too slow and that coordination with other agencies "could improve."

A key issue raised by a number of actors interviewed by IRIN was the level of participation of local Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the cluster meetings established to coordinate aid agencies' response to the Nahr al-Bared crisis.

"Cluster meetings are held in a hotel in Tripoli [northern Lebanon], but all our directors are based in Beirut, so only local staff in Tripoli can attend the meetings," said Leila al-Ali, director of Najdeh, a local NGO that works in and around the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, targeting primarily women and children.

"Our Tripoli staff do not all speak English, so have limited access to the meetings. The meetings should be organized in a place accessible to all."

Separate appeal

While expressing satisfaction with the master plan for Nahr al-Bared's reconstruction, Najdeh said UNRWA's donor appeal left some gaps unfilled, prompting the local agency to launch its own appeal to donors on 19 June for $2.5m to cover health, education, economic and rights needs.

Some international agencies criticized the absence of key non-UN actors from the UNRWA appeal.

"It is a shame that all the organizations and actors working in Nahr al-Bared were not able to put together a consolidated appeal to give donors an overall picture," said Ulla Backlund, country director for the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Lebanon, which has been aiding reconstruction in the camp.

"All the actors should have been given the chance to see where their experience could be best put to use for the good of the beneficiaries."

Responding to the criticism, Pablo Ruiz, a recovery adviser at the UN Development Program (UNDP), attending the Vienna conference, said: "The entire process for planning and reconstruction has been very participatory and very inclusive, and we see this document being presented to donors as a consolidated appeal."

All interviewees expressed concern that the level of complexity in terms of political, security, social and legal issues around the status of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and rebuilding the currently accessible areas of Nahr al-Bared, in which UNRWA has no legal remit to operate, was hampering coordination.

"Confusion" over status of new camp

"The status of the new camp creates a lot of confusion and has an impact on coordination," said Bassem Chit of Lebanon Support, an information service aimed at supporting humanitarian efforts, which is directly involved with Nahr al-Bared.

"There is general coordination and information is good, but there are still lots of gaps. The participation of local NGOs in cluster meetings is quite low and decisions are taken outside the meetings; the same problem as in Iraq," he said.

Chit warned of the dangers of the plethora of agencies operating in and around Nahr al-Bared not coordinating on a comprehensive strategy.

"The issue is not to create more inequality by having one NGO fix only 20 percent of the camp to a high standard, but leave the rest at a low standard," he said. "It is much better to raise standards across the board as a collective process across the clusters. This is not happening."

OCHA

Several actors highlighted the absence of the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) from Lebanon since its short deployment to the country during the July War in 2006.

Jamie McGoldrick, head of OCHA's Humanitarian Reform Support Unit in Geneva, told IRIN he agreed that cooperation between agencies could always be improved. "Basically when faced with a new emergency, it is very difficult to implement clusters, which are a new approach. This has been adapted and brought to Lebanon. It is a new culture, a new way of collaborating and responding and it will take time for those agencies to understand roles and responsibilities," he said.

McGoldrick also said some of the issues raised by local NGOs were of a longstanding nature. "The issue of language, for example: We have faced this since the first time clusters were used in the Pakistan earthquake. But we are working on them and over time we will overcome them. The most important thing is that we expect those NGOs who feel excluded and have issues to bring this to the attention of cluster leads."

Challenges

The UN Resident Coordinator's Office has been supporting UNRWA's coordination efforts from the onset of the crisis.

"The reconstruction of Nahr al-Bared raises a number of challenges, legally, politically and in terms of mandate ... Though coordination has improved, more can be done," said Fernando Hiraldo, adviser to the UN resident coordinator in Lebanon.

"We hope the Vienna donor conference opens a new phase where the financial resources needed for the reconstruction of the camp and the implementation of the different components submitted to donors are clearly explained."

Werkkamp
2008

Werkkamp
2007

Werkkamp
2006